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Large budget deficits pose real threats to macroeconomic stabil-
ity and therefore to growth and development. Large deficits will,
perhaps after some time, lead to inflat on, exchange crises, ex-
ternal debt crises, and high real interest rates.
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Excessive budget deficits can lead to inflation,  W.aether  any particular path of fiscal policy
exchange crises, extemal debt crises, and high  is sustainable has to be checked through projec-
real interest rates - with implications for the  tions of the debt-to-GNP ratio. A given deficit is
real exchange rate, the trade account, and  more likely to be sustainable the higher the
investmnent.  But the links are not automatic, for  growth rate of output.
there are choices in the sources of financing -
and lags in the effects of money printing and  Of course, the fact that a fiscal policy is sus-
borrowing on inflation and interest rates.  tainable does not mean that it is optimal.  A
flscal deficit crowds out private investment -
Nor are moderate budget deficits to be  and it might well be desirable to reduce the debt-
avoided at all costs. Small deficits can be  to-GNP ratio to crowd private investment in.
financed without creating excessive inflation,
exchange crises, or an excess buildup of debt.  If  Similarly, it is not optimal to collect the
the real interest rate exceeds the growth rate of  maximum possible amount of revenue fi.  n
GNP, no primary deficit larger than the maxi-  seignorage, but rather a smaller amount corre-
mum arnount of seignorage revenue (the revenue  sponding to a lower inflation rate.
from printing money) the government can obtain
is sustainable.  Govemments cannot use seig-  Theory and evidence both wam that large
norage permanently to finance primary deficits  budget deficits pose real threats to macroecon-
over 2.5% of GNP without expecting inflation to  omic stability and therefore to economic growth
accelerate - and even seignorage of 2.5% of  and development.
GNP would be sustainable only in a rapidly
growing economy.
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This paper is a slightly revised  version of a paper presented at the
zahid Husain Memorial Lecture at the State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi,
March 2, 1989.  Collaboration from William Easterly of the Macroeconomic
Adjustment and Growth Division and useful comments from Bela Balassa and
Johannes Linn are gratefully acknowledged.The topic  of this  Zahid  Husain  Memorial  Lecture,  the  economics  of
the  government  budget  constraint,  is  not  the  most  obvious  choice  for  a
central  bank audience. Surely  it  would  be more appropriate  to talk  of the
staple  questions  of monetary  policy,  whether  to target  the  money  stock  or
rates  of return  on assets,  whether  to  fix  the  exchange  rate  or allow  it to
float,  and  if to fix  it,  to  what currency  basket,  how to  maintain
prudential  control  of the  finar.cial  system  while  obtaining  the  beneficial
effects  of competition,  and  so forth.
One interpretation  would  be that  the  choice  of topic  is  dictated  by
prudence. Central  bankers  know  that  fiscal  deficits  are  the  ultimate
source  of  macroeconomic  instability  and inflation,  while  finance  ministers
are  more inclined  to attribute  their  macroeconomic  problems  to inadequate
monetary  policy;  there  is  therefore  nothing  safer  than  talking  about  the
dangers  of fiscal  excess  in  a central  bank.  But  prudence  is  not
consciously  the  reason  for  choosing  this  topic. Rather  it is  that  fiscal
policy  is indeed  key  to  macroeconomic  stability  and  one  of the  keys  to
developme.t  --  and  that  recent  developments  in  the  analysis  of the
consequences  of deficit  finance  reinforce  that  message.2
When government  spending  and  taxation  amount  as  they  do in  many
industrialized  economies  to  around  40%  of GNP,  it is inevitable  that  tax
and  expenditure  decisions  exert  a  major  impact  on the  allocation  of
resources. Government  spending  in low-income  developing  countries  averages
20%  of GNP 2, still  quite  sufficient  to  affect  the  allocation  of resources
throughout  the  economy. The  method  of financing  of that  spending  also
affects  the  allocation  of resources,  both  because  taxes  and tariffs  affect
relative  prices,  and  also  because  the  financing  ofthe  government  budget
deficit  affects  inflation,  real  interest  rates,  the  internal  and  external
debt,  and the  development  of the  financial  system.
Crucial  as these  allocative  effects  of fiscal  policy  are, I  shall
concentrate  in  this  lecture  on the  macroeconomic  effects  of government
budget  deficits,  focussing  on the  consequences  of different  methods  of
financing  the  deficit,  and  the  links  between  the  budget  deficit  and
inflation. The lecture  is  built  around  three  simple  relationships:  the
national  income  accounts  budget  deficit  identity;  the  budget  deficit
financing  identity;  and  the  dynamic  equation  for  the  evolution  of the  debt
to  GNP ratio.
I.  Macroeconomic  Effects  of the  Deficit:  Standard  Analysis.
The  Keynesian  revolution  brought  the  budget  deficit  out  of the
closet  as  a macroeconomic  variable. While  governments  had run  budget
deficits  without  the  aid  of  Keynesian  theories  before,  the  pre-Keynesian
2World  Development  ReRort  1988,  Chapter  2,  contains  comparative  data  on
government  revenues  and  expenditure.  The  Report  presents  an authoritative
modern  account  of the  role  of fiscal  policy.3
presumption  was that  the  budget  should  generally  be balanced,  or perhaps
even in  surplus  in  peacetime  in  order  to  pay  off  the  government  debt
generated  by wartime  deficits. The  devotion  to  balanced  budgets  is  evident
from  the  desire  of political  candidates  and  governments  to  balance  the
budget  even  during  the  Great  Depression.  Though  few  succeeded  in  balancing
the  budget,  some  governments  raised  tax  rates  during  that  period.
One of the  contributions  of Keynes  was to  provide  a framework--one
which  we now recognize  to  be incomplete--in  which  it is  possible  to analyze
the  question  of  how the  deficit  should  behave. The  earliest  emphasis  was
on fiscal  policy  and  the  deficit  as components  of aggregate  demand. From
that  perspective,  Keynesians  saw  no need  to  balance  the  budget  during
periods  of recession. Instead  the  notion  of the  cyclically  balanced
budget,  that  the  budget  should  be in  balance  on  average  over  the  business
cycle,  in  surplus  during  booms  and  in  deficit  during  recessions,  was
developed  as a  norm for  fiscal  behavior.
There  were  of course  well-known  refinements  to  this  conception. In
the  first  instance,  the  balanced  budget  multiplier  shows  that  the  deficit
is  not  an  unambiguous  measure  of the  impact  of fiscal  policy  on aggregate
demand;  given  the  budget  deficit,  an equal  increase  in  government  spending
and  revenues  increases  aggregate  demand. Second,  the  budget  deficit  is
itself  endogenous,  affected  by the  state  of the  economy  as  well as
affecting  it.  As a result,  the  notion  of the  full  employment,  or  high
employment,  or structural  deficit  was  developed. This  estimates  the  size
of the  budget  deficit  as it  would  be if  output  were  at the  full  employment
level 3.
3Appendix  1 contains  a  discussion  of  budget  deficit  measurement  and
definitions.4
Once  the  threat  of widesp:ead  post-World  War  II unemployment  had
receded,  the  emphasis  shifted  from  aggregate  demand  to the  effects  of
fiscal  policy  on the  components  of demand. Here  the  overall  saving-
investment  identity  or resource  constraint  facing  the  economy  is  a useful
guide  to  analysis:
(1)  Budget deficit - (Saving - Investment) +  (Current  account deficit)
Since  equation  (1)  is  an identity,  there  is  not  much  arguing  with
it 4. To illustrate  its  uses,  suppose  the  economy  is  at full  employment,
and  take  the  rate  of saving  as given. Equation  (1),  the  saving-investment
identity,  then  implies  the  crowding-out  problem:  an increase  in the  budget
deficit  will result  in  either  a reduction  in investment  or  an increase  in
the  current  account  deficit. Until  this  decade,  textbooks--at  least  U.S.
textbooks--tended  to  emphasize  the  possibility  of crowding  out investment.
The  clear  relationship  in  this  decade  between  the  U.S.  budget  deficit  and
its  trade  deficit  has  reminded  us that  there  are  two  terms  on the  right
hand side.
It  would  be a mistake  though  to overcompensate  by assuming  there  is
an automatic  one-to-one  link  between  the  budget  and  trade  deficits 5. To
take  one  example,  the  U.K.  has  been  running  a large  trade  deficit  in  recent
months  while  maintaining  a strong  fiscal  position. The  effect  on the  trade
deficit  of a reduction  in the  budget  deficit  depends  on the  accompanying
4It is  however  necessary  to  define  terms  consistently;  the  budget  deficit  in
(1)  is  that  of the  consolidated  public  sector,  and  saving  and  investment  are
those  of the  private  sector.
5Balassa  (1988)  finds  a high  correlation  between  budget  deficits  and  trade
deficits  in  the  developed  but  not  the  developing  countries.5
monetary  policy  and its  impact  on the  exchange  and  real  interest  rates.
Fiscal  contraction  accompanied  by monetary  easing  would  red-ice  the  interest
rate  and  lead  to a  depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate,  thus  tending  to
increase  investment  while  reducing  tLue  trade  deficit.
The  standard  Keynesian  analys- of the  impact  of fiscal  policy  has
been  affected  by two  important  theoretical  developments.  The  first  is the
more  sophisticated  model  of saving  behavior  that  emerges  from  the  life-
cycle  and  permane~nt  income  theories  of consumption  of  Modigliani  and
Friedman. To this  point  we have implicitly  taken  the  rate  of saving  as
determined  by the  level  of disposable  income,  and  have  not focussed  on the
link  between  the  budget  deficit  and  saving. The  life  cycle  and  permanent
income  theories  both  relate  current  consumption  to  a measure  of  permanent
or life-time  disposable  income. Accordingly,  a current  change  in  taxes
that  does  not  change  the  present  value  of taxes  should  not,  ceteris
paribus,  reduce  current  consumption.  Thus  a temporary  tax  change  should
have  a smaller  effect  on  consuription  than  a  permanent  tax  change. This  of
course  implies  that  the  impact  of changes  in the  budget  deficit  on spending
is  affected  by expectations  of the  permanence  of the  deficit.
Pursuing  the  argument  to its  logical  conclusion,  Barro  (1974)
showed  that  under  a  very specific  set  of assumptions,  lump-sum  changes  in
taxes  would  have  no impact  on consumer  spending. Equivalently,  and  this is
a more  striking  statement,  a cut  in taxes  that  increases  disposable  income,
would  automatically  be accompanied  by an identical  increase  in saving.
This is  the  so-called  Ricardian  equivalence  result,  that  deficits  and  taxes
are  equivalent  in  their  effects  on consumption.6
The  explanation  is  quite  simple:  the  far-seeing  consumer  recognizes
that  the  government  debt  generated  through  deficit  spending  will eventually
be paid  off  by increased  taxes,  the  present  value  of  which  is exactly  equal
to  the  plesent  value  of the  reduction  in  taxes. Taking  the  implied
increase  in future  taxes  into  account,  he or she  saves  the  amount  necessary
to  pay  them.
The  potential  empirical  importance  of the  Ricardian  equivalence
hypothesis  cannot  be exaggerated. If  the  hypothesis  holds,  then  budget
deficits  do  not  affect  national  saving,  nor interest  rates,  nor  the  balance
of payments,  and  nor  does  the  method  of financing  of social  security  affect
capital  accumulation.  In  terms  of equation  (1),  the  hypothesis  implies
that  an increase  in the  budget  deficit  would,  under  certain  circumstances,
be accompanied  by an increase  in  private  saving--and  that  both investment
and  the  trade  balance  would  therefore  be unaffected.
Despite  the  sharpness  of its  predictions,  it  has  not  been  possible
to reject  Ricardian  equivalence  sufficiently  decisively  to  persuade
proponents  of the  theory 6 to  change  their  views. Others  regard  the
evidence  as sufficient  to rule  out  Ricardian  equivalence  as  more than  an
extremely  interesting  theoretical  possibility.  I  believe  the  evidence,
including  that  from  the  United  States  in this  decade,  still  supports  the
view that  tax  cuts increase  aggregate  demand,  though  the  impact  does  depend
on expectations  of the  permanence  of the  change.
6Bernheim  (1987)  reviews  and  extends  the  theory  and  evidence,  arguing
strongly  against  Ricardian  equivalence.7
The second  development  takes  off  from  the  extremely  short-run
nature  of the  Keynesian  analysis  of fiscal  policy. Because  asset  stocks
are  assumed  fixed  in the  Keynesian  model,  the  consequences  of the  method  by
which  the  budget  deficit  is  financed  are  not  pursued.
II.  Financing  the  Budget  Deficit.
There  are  four  ways  of financing  the  public  sector  deficit:  by
printing  money,  running  down  foreign  exchange  reserves,  borrowing  abroad,
and  borrowing  domestically.  The  public  sector  in  this  case  is defined  to
exclude  the  central  bank,  whose  profits  from  the  printing  of  money  are
treated  as a financing  source. In  a word  equation 7:
(2)  Budget  deficit  - Money  printing  +  (foreign  reserve  use
+  foreign  borrowing)  +  domestic  borrowing
The  terms  on the  right  hand  side  can  be grouped  in different  ways.
For instance,  the  parentheses  around  the  foreign  components  emphasize  the
link  between  the  budget  deficit  and  the  trade  account,  as in equation  (1).
Alternatively,  parentheses  could  be placed  around  (money  printing  +  foreign
reserve  use),  which  is  equal  to domestic  credit  creation;  this  emphasizes
that  domestic  credit  creation  is the  alternative  to  borrowing.
To a  useful  first  approximation,  we can  associate  each  of the  forms
of financing  in equation  (2)  with  a  major  macroeconomic  imbalance.  Money
printing  is  associated  with inflation;  foreign  reserve  use is  associated
7In  both equations  (1)  and (2),  government  revenue  from  the  printing  of
money  is treated  as a financing  source. Private  saving  in  equation  (1)  is
defined  to include  additions  to  money  holding.8
with the  onset  of exchange  crises;  foreign  borrowing  is  associated  with  an
external  debt  crisis;  and  domestic  borrowing  is  associated  with  higher  real
interest  rates  and  possibly  explosive  debt  dynamics. The first
approximation  is  however  not the  entire  story,  for  there  are important
links  between  these  problems:  for  instance  between  foreign  exchange  use  and
external  debt  crises;  and  between  domestic  borrowing  and  inflation. In the
next section  we focus  particularly  on the  deficit-inflation  link.
We now  examine  each  of the  methods  of deficit  financing  and  its
consequences.
Money  Rrinting.
It is  straightforward  to relate  the  creation  of  base  money  to
inflation  in  the  usual  monetarist  way. The  printing  of  money  at  a rate
that  exceeds  the  demand  for  it  at the  current  price  level  creates  excess
cash  balances  in  the  hands  of the  public. The  public's  attempts  to  reduce
excess  cash  holdings  eventually  drive  up the  overall  price  level,  until
equilibrium  is  restored. Of course,  the  link  between  money  and  prices  is
not  precise:  initially  an increase  in  the  real  money  stock  may  reduce
interest  rates,  particularly  in  a low-inflation  economy.
The amount  of revenue  that  the  government  can  expect  to obtain  from
the  printing  of money  is  determined  by the  demand  for  base  or  high-powered
money  in the  economy,  the  real  rate  of  growth  of the  economy,  and  the
elasticity  of the  demand  for  real  balances  with respect  to inflation  and
income. Assume  for  convenience  that  the  income  elasticity  of the  demand
for  base  money  is  unity. Assume  also  that  ti>  currency  to  GNP  ratio  is
13%,  as it is in  Pakistan--this  is  high  by international  standards 8.
8I  have  changed  here from  high-powered  money  to currency,  because
rediscounts  to  the  banking  system  of  about  6% of  GNP  effectively  reduce  the
base  on  which  the  government  earns  seignorage.9
Then for  every  one  percentage  point  that  GNP  increases,  the
government  can  obtain  0.13  percentage  points  of GNP  in revenue  through  the
printing  of  money  that  just  meets  the  increased  demand  fir  real  balances.
At an annual  growth  rat,  of 6.5%,  the  government  should  be able  to obtain
nearly  0.9%  of  GNP for  financing  the  budget  deficit  through  the  non-
inflationary  printing  of money,  increasing  the  high-powered  money  stock  at
an annual  rate  of 6.5%.
Beyond  that  rate  of growth,  and  given  a stable  demand  function  for
currency,  inflation  will  result. If  the  ratio  of base  to GNP  were
invariant  to the  inflation  rate,  it  would  be easy  to  estimate  the  amount  of
revenue  collected  at different  inflation  rates. For  instance,  at a 10%
inflation  rate  the  government  would  be able  to finance  an extra  1.3%  of GNP
of  budget  deficit  through  seignorage,  the  government's  right  to  print
money.
However,  the  demand  for  high-powered  money  declines  as the
inflation  rate  rises. Eventually  the  government's  revenue  from  seignorage
reaches  a maximum,  as seen  in  Figure  1. Thereafter  increases  in the  growth
rate  of  money  lead  to  more inflation  and  less  revenue. In this  situation
there  is  a true  Laffer  curve:  beyond  point  A in Figure  1,  the  government
can  obtain  more revenue  by printing  money  less  rapidly.
At what rate  of inflation  is  the  government's  revenue  from  money
printing  maximized? The  historical  record  shows  average  (not  maximum)
rates  of seignorage  of about  1%  of GNP  for  the  industrialized  countries,
and  less  than  2.5%  of  GNP for  the  developing  countries  (Fischer,  1982).
Estimates  of the  inflation  rate  at which  the  maximum  rate  of seignorage  is10
attained  range  from  30%  to  more than  100%. However,  these  estimates  are
misleading,  for  there  are lags  in the  process  of  adaptation  of  money  demand
to inflation. In the  very short  run  of a few  days  or  weeks,  the  government
can  almost  always  increase  its  revenue  by printing  money  more rapidly. But
the  longer  a  process  of high  inflation  continues,  the  more  the  demand  for
real  balances  at any  given  inflation  rate  declines. People  find  other  ways
of doing  business,  especially  by transacting  in foreign  currencies.
The  dynamic  process  associated  with  high inflation,  in the  high
double  digits,  is  inherently  unstable. The  government  may initially  obtain
large  amounts  of revenue,  perhaps  even  7-8%  of  GNP  by increasing  the  money
stock  rapidly. But  as the  inflation  proceeds  and  individuals  find  ways of
reducing  their  holdings  of local  currency,  the  government  has  to print
money  more  rapidly  to  obtain  the  same  revenue. Thus  it is  safe  to argue
that  rates  of seignorage  of much  more than  2.5%  of  GNP  would  not  be
sustainable,  and  that  even that  rate  would  only  be possible  in  a  very
rapidly  growing  economy.
In the  extreme  cases,  reliance  on seignorage  revenue  to  finance  the
deficit  leads  to  hyperinflation.  A recent  example  is  Bolivia  in  1984-85.
Inflation  in  Bolivia  soared  to  over  11,000  percent  in 1985,  although
revenue  from  currency  creation  fell  to 8%  of GDP  in 1985  from  14%  of GDP in
1984. But  Bolivia  is  only  one  extreme  example,  and  many  other
governments--including  recently  Nicaragua  and  Peru--have  suffered  from  the
same  phenomenon  in recent  years,  as  well  as durir.g  the  great
hyperinflations.  The  instability  of the  process  is  reinforced  by the
decline  in the  efficiency  of the  tax  system  as the  inflation  rate  rises,
the  so-called  Keynes-Tanzi  effect  (Tanzi,  1977).11
Reserve  use.
The second  means  of financing  the  government  budget  deficit  is to
run  down  foreign  exchange  reserves. By running  down  reserves  instead  of
printing  money,  the  government  can  hope  for  a time  to  mitigate  the
inflationary  effects  of a deficit. This  policy  appreciates  the  exchange
rate  relative  to the  level  it  would  otherwise  have  had. The policy  of
slowing  the  rate  of exchange  depreciation  to slow  down  inflation  (carried
out  not  only  through  reserve  use  but  also  through  increased  foreign
borrowing)  is one  that  has  been tried  time  and  again,  and  one  that  cannot
be maintained  unless  the  essentials,  namely  fiscal  policy,  are  made
compatible  with the  lower  inflation.
Use  of international  reserves  to finance  the  deficit  has a clear
limit. Private  sector  anticipation  that  the  limit  is  about  to  be reached
can  provoke  capital  flight  and  a  balance  of payments  crisis,  since
exhaustion  of reserves  will  be associated  with currency  devaluation.  The
devaluation  that  takes  place  in  response  to a run  on the  currency  may  be
blamed  on speculators,  but is  most likely  an entirely  rational  private
sector  response  to  unsustainable  public  policies  (see  Krugman,  1979).
This  is a  plausible  explanation  for  the  event  that  precipitated  the
debt  crisis  --  the  exhaustion  of reserves  in  Mexico  in  August  19829. A
loss  of fiscal  control  resulted  in  deficits  of 14%  of GDP in  1981  and  18%
in 1982. Capital  flight  was  proceeding  at the  rate  of $7  billion  a year
over  the  1979-82  period. Finally,  a speculative  attack  on the  remaining
90f course,  the  exhaustion  of  Mexican  reserves  was  not the  underlying  cause
of the  debt  crisis.12
reserves  took  place  in  August  1982,  leading  to the  suspension  of payments
and  the  beginning  of the  rescheduling  process.
Foreign  borrowing.
The  third  method  of financing  the  public  sector  deficit  is direct
foreign  borrowing. As in the  case  of  reserve  use, recourse  to foreign
borrowing  tends  to  appreciate  the  exchange  rate,  damaging  exports  and
encouraging  imports. The  dangers  of excessive  reliance  on external
borrowing  to finance  the  budget  deficit,  and  of large  budget  deficits,  are
convincingly  illustrated  by the  debt  crisis. Most,  though  not  all,  of the
countries  that  developed  debt  servicing  difficulties  were  running
excessively  large  public  deficits. Past  overborrowing  and the  perception
of  uncreditworthiness  of  most  major  borrowers  have  caused  this  source  of
finance  to  be severely  limited  for  most  highly-indebted  countries  at
present.
We  have already  noted  that  there  is  no  necessary  link  between
budget  deficits  and  trade  deficits. Budget  deficits  can  be financed  by
printing  money  and  by domestic  borrowing. However  when  domestic  capital
markets  are  thin,  and  domestic  borrowing  possibilities  limited,  a situation
that  exists  in  some  developing  countries,  the  link  between  the  budget
deficit  and  external  borrowing  is  more likely  to  be closo. For  example,
large  fiscal  deficits  (between  7  and  11%  of GDP)  in  Bangladesh  during  the
1980s  have  been  mirrored  in  sizeable  current  account  deficits. Recent
fiscal  adjustment  through  expenditure  cutbacks  have resulted  in  a
substantial  current  account  improvement.  Looking  at the  relationship  in
the  reverse  direction,  reductions  in  the  availability  of  external13
financing,  as for  some  of the  debtor  countries,  force  either  fiscal
contraction  or inflation.
Domestic  borrowing.
The  final  form  of finance,  available  to some  developing  countries,
is issuance  of domestic  debt. This  is  usually  intermediated  by the  banking
system,  although  in  a few  cases,  such  as  Mexico  and  Brazil,  government
bonds  have  been  sold  directly  to the  private  sector. To be considered
nonmonetary  debt,  borrowing  from  the  banking  system  must  not  be financed  by
central  bank rediscounts.  While  government  domestic  borrowing  is often
thought  of as a way to  avoid  both inflation  and  external  crises,  it  cai;ies
its  own  dangers  if  used  to excess--a  point  to  which  we turn  below. By
definition,  government  borrowing  reduces  the  credit  which  would  otherwise
be available  to the  private  sector,  putting  pressure  on domestic  interest
rates.
In countries  as  diverse  as  Turkey  and  Thailand,  reliance  on domestic
debt  has indeed  brought  high real  domestic  interest  rates. In  Turkey  the
real  domestic  lending  rate  reached  50  percent  in 1987. More  moderate
domestic  borrowing  in  Thailand  led  to real  lending  rates  ranging  from  15 to
19 percent  during  the  1982-86  period.
Where interest  rates  are  controlled,  domestic  borrowing  still  leads
to  credit  rationing  and  crowding  out  of private  sector  investment.  If the
economy  is  well integrated  with  international  capital  markets,  then
government  domestic  borrowing  will tend  to  push the  private  sector  into
borrowing  more  abroad.14
We turn  now  to debt  dynamics,  to  evaluate  the  stability  of that
process.
III.  Debt  Dynamics.
To examine  the  long-term  consequences  of running  deficits,  we use
identity  (3),  which  shows  the  determinants  of the  change  in government
debt.  It is  most  useful  to  concentrate  on the  ratio  of the  debt to  a
measure  of the  scale  of the  economy;  accordingly  we focus  on the  ratio  of
government  debt to  GNP,  which  we denote  b.  Debt is  now  defined  to include
both the  net  external  and  domestic  debts. In terms  of equation  (2),  we
consolidate  foreign  and  domestic  borrowing,  and  treat  changes  in foreign
reserves  as equivalent  to net  external  borrowing.
The  change  in  the  debt  ratio  (b)  is  equal  to the  non-interest  (or
primary)  deficit  of the  total  public  sector,  minus  the  part that  is
financed  by printing  money,  plus the  current  debt  ratio  (b)  times  the
average  real  interest  rate  on the  debt  minus  the  growth  rate  of  GNP (this
is the  last  term  ir.  (3)):
(3)  Change in b - (Primary  deficit/GNP) - (Seignorage/GNP)
+  (Real  interest  rate  - growth  rate)  x b
This  equation,  which  is the  key  to  understanding  debt  dynamics,  has
a simple  intuitive  explanationl 1 . The  non-interest  deficit  has to  be
IOThis  equation  can  be derived  starting  from  equation  (2),  recognizing  that
the  sum  of domestic  and  net  foreign  borrowing  is  equal  to the  change  in the
government  debt,  and that  the  government  budget  deficit  is equal  to the
primary  deficit  plus interest  payments. A very  similar  equation  is  useful
for  understanding  external  debt  dynamics:  in that  case  the  dependent
equation  is the (foreign)  debt  to  exports  ratio,  the  primary  deficit  on the
right  hand side  of (3)  is  replaced  by the  non-interest  current  account
deficit,  there  is  no analog  of seignorage,  and the  growth  rate  on the  right
hand side  is that  of exports.15
financed  with  new  debt  to the  extent  that  this  deficit  exceeds  the  amount
of  money  creation  by the  central  bank.  In  addition,  nominal  interest
expenditures  have to  be refinanced  with  new  debt.  However,  the  denominator
of the  debt ratio  is  nominal  GNP,  so the  debt  ratio  will decline  with
either  inflation  or real  GNP  growth  in  the  absence  of new  borrowing.
The dynamics  of debt  and  the  sustainability  of deficits  are
particularly  affected  by the  difference  between  the  real  interest  rate  and
the  growch  rate  of  GNP. Assume  first  that  the  real  interest  rate  on  debt
exceeds  the  growth  rate. Then  debt  dynamics  are  unstable. It is  not then
possible  to run  a  perma.ent  primary  deficit  that  exceeds  the  amount  of
revenue  the  government  can  obtain  through  sdignorage.  The  conclusion
deserves  emphasis:  if the  government  is  running  a primary  deficit  larger
than  the  amount  of seignorage  it  can  obtain,  and  if the  real  interest  rate
exceeds  the  economy's  growth  rate,  the  debt  to  GNP  ratio  will continue
rising  without  limit. At some  point  it  will  be impossibl3  for  the
government  to sell  its  debt,  and  the  process  will  have  to  be brought  to  an
end  by cutting  the  budget  deficit. The  point  at  which  the  process  has to
end  depends  or.  the  expectations  of the  public. When the  public  recognizes
the  unsustainability  of the  government's  fiscal  policy,  it  will  cease
buying  government  debt,  and  thereby  force  a change  in  policy.
The debt  dynamics  equation  (3)  has an interesting  implication,
first  pointed  out  by Sargent  and  Wallace  (1981). Suppose  that  the
government  tightens  monetary  policy  by reducing  the  rate  of  printing  of
money  and  increasing  borrowing. The  debt  increases;  either  deficits  will
be higher  in future,  or the  government  will  have to  print  more  money  in16
future  to  keep the  deficit  constant. If future  deficits  are to  be held
constant,  then  the  increased  printing  of money  in future  will  mean  more
inflation  in futuie. Generally,  the  expectation  of future  inflation
increases  current  inflation.  And, as Sargent  and  Wallace  show,  it is  even
possible  in  certain--though  not  all--circumstances  that  the  impact  of the
expected  increase  in  future  inflation  outweighs  that  of the  lower  rate  of
money  printing  today,  so that  an apparently  contractionary  monetary  policy
today  will increase  current  inflation.
We have already  discussed  maximum  sustainable  rates  of seignorage,
and  have suggested  that  governments  cannot  use  seignorage  permanently  to
finance  primary  deficits  in  excess  of 2.5%  of  GNP  without  expecting
inflation  to accelerate--and  even  that  would  have  to  be in a rapidly
growing  economy.
What  happens  if the  real  interest  rate  is  less  than  the  growth
rate? This is  a  world  where  the  painful  tradeoffs  just  discussed  do not
exist. Debt is  eroded  over  time  through  growth,  so primary  deficits  in
excess  of seignorage  revenue  are  sustainable.  A so-called  Ponzill  scheme
of  borrowing  to  pay interest  is  always  possible. This  certainly  seemed  to
be the  case  in the  late  seventies,  as  high inflation  rates  produced
negative  ex  post  real interest  rates. It is  also true  that  real  interest
rates  are  very likely  to  be below  the  growth  rate in  economies  that  are
growing  rapidly,  such  as the  Asian  NIEs.
llCharles  Ponzi  was  a Boston  resident  who in the  1920s  made a fortune
through  a pyramiding  scheme,  but  who  then  ended  up £n  jail,  and  was later
penniless.17
There  are  some  who  believe  that  the  real  interest  rate  should
normally  be below  the  growth  rate. But  an  economist's  instincts  are  that
such  a free  lunch  is  not  possible,  and  the  instincts  are  right. Real
interest  rates  can  be temporarily  below  the  growth  rate,  and  could  be below
the  growth  rate  for  a long  period  in  a rapidly  growing  economy--this  is
part  of the  virtuous  circle  of growth. But  market  forces  tend  to  prevent
the  real  interest  rate  from  remaining  below  the  real  growth  rate
permanently. As more  debt  piles  up,  the  pressure  on  bond  markets  drives  up
the  interest  rate. At the  level  of the  world  economy,  the  normal  situation
should  be thought  of as one  where  the  real  interest  rate  exceeds  the  growth
rate.
It  might  seem  that  the  government  could  make  a Ponzi  scheme
possible  by controlling  domestic  interest  rates. But  this  is a tax  on
domestic  bond-holders  in  the  amount  by  which  the  controlled  rate  is  below
the  long-run  equilibrium  rate.  Savers  respond  by taking  their  savings
elsewhere,  and the  government  faces  a limit  on how  much it can  borrow. The
experiences  of countries  such  as  Argentina,  Mexico,  and  Venezuela  with
interest  rate  controls  and  capital  flight  confirms  this  limitation.  We are
back again  to the  world  of tough  choices  and  unforgiving  tradeoffs.
Sustainable  deficits.
Whether  the  deficit  is sustainable  depends  on its  size,  and  on the
growth  rate  of the  economy. Examining  equation  (3),  a  higher  growth  rate
allows  the  government  to  obtain  more  revenue  by printing  money,  and  it
reduces  the  last  term  in  the  equation. Rapid  growth  permits  a larger
deficit.18
This  argument  helps  explain  why countries  such  as India,  Malaysia,
Pakistan,  and  Thalland  where  growth  was at or  above  5% over  1980-86,  have
been  able  to run  sizeable  domestic  deficits  while  inflation  has  been in the
single  digits,  whereas  Argentina  and  Brazil  --  with  virtually  no growth  but
with  smaller  inflation-adjusted  deficits  --  have  been  plagued  with triple-
digit  inflation.  This is  not  to say  that  public  deficits  do not  matter  in
high-growth  economies,  only that  they  can  be bigger,  so long  as the  growth
continues.
Whether  a given  fiscal  policy  is  sustainable  is  a question  that  can
be answered  by doing  detailed  projections  of the  future  course  of the  debt-
to-GNP  ratio. Equation  (3)  provides  the  essential  analytic  tool;  the
analysis  requires  subsidiary  assumptions  about  the  demand  function  for
money,  the  desired  inflation  rate,  the  real  interest  rate,  and the  growth
rate  of the  economy. If the  analysis  shows  the  debt-to-GNP  ratio  to  be
rising  continually,  then  the  fiscal  policy  has to  be changed.
It is sometimes  argued  that  a deficit  that  results  from  high  public
investment  will  be sustainable.  However,  this  argument  can  easily  be
overdone. In the  first  instance,  while  public  infrastructure  spending
often  has a  very  high  return,  many low-return  or no-return  items  may  also
be included  in the  category  of 'investment".  More important,  even  if
public  investment  has  a  high return,  it is  necessary  that  the  government
capture  the  additional  returns  from  the  investment  if it  is to  be self-
sustaining. For  example,  suppose  that  a project  yields  the  remarkably  high
real  return  of 15%,  that  the  marginal  tax  rate  is 20%,  and  that  the
government  borrows  at 7% to  finance  the  project. The  government  will  be19
receiving  only  3%  of the  cost  of the  project  in  tax  revenues,  even  though
its  social  yield  is  15% (assuming  that  the  entire  social  yield  is
pecuniary). Thus  the  inrvestment  project  still  adds  to future  deficits,
despite  its  high  yield--though  to  be sure  its  impact  on future  deficits  is
smaller  than  that  of current  government  spending  financed  through  deficits.
Economies  can  proceed  for  long  periods  with large  deficits,  as the
Italian  economy  has.  It  helps  in these  cases  if  the  domestic  saving  rate
is  high,  so that  individuals  are  willing  to  absorb  relatively  large  amounts
of government  debt in  their  portfolios.  But the  relentless  increase  in the
debt-to-GNP  ratio  means  that  even  in the  Italian  case,  fiscal  pclicy  will
eventually  have to  change.,
IV  Deficits  and Inflation.
Our analysis  has  made it  clear  that  there  is  no automatic  link
between  budget  deficits  and  inflation.  The  visitor  to  high inflation-high
deficit  economies  is  often  told  that  the  deficit  cannot  be the  cause  of
inflation  because  the  correlation  between  them  is  low.  In  particular,  it
often  happens  that  a contractionary  policy  that  starts  by raising  the
controlled  prices  of public  enterprises  and  subsidized  goods,  and  by
devaluing,  will  both  raise  the  inflation  rate  and  reduce  the  deficit. In
the  United  States,  as in Italy,  the  high  deficits  of this  decade  have  been
accompanied  by a decline  in inflation.
Nonetheless,  budget  deficits  do sooner  or later  tend  to  create
inflation,  and  countries  with  very  high  budget  deficits  are  very  likely  to
find  themselves  at some  point  confronted  with extremely  high  rates  of20
inflation. There  have  been  massive  budget  deficits  in  all  the  great
hyperinflations,  with the  inflationary  process  and  the  deficit  feeding  on
each  other  through  the  Tanzi  effect  as  higher  inflation  reduces  tax
revenue,  and  through  declines  in  seignorage  revenue  as  higher  inflation
causes  a flight  from  money.
The  correlation  between  the  deficit  and  inflation  is low  in the
early  stages  of inflations  in  part  for  the  reason  explained  above,  that
programs  to  reduce  deficits  are  often  inflationary.  It is low  also  because
the  economy  adjusts  slowly  to inflationary  pressures. And the  correlation
may  be low  for  a third  reason,  because  the  public  in  an economy  with  a high
deficit  may  at different  times  have  different  expectations  about  how the
I  . .
deficit  will  eventually  be closed. For  instance,  if  the  public  believes  at
one  point  that  the  government  will  attemit  to  deal  with its  fiscal  problem
through  an inflation  that  erodes  the  value  of the  public  debt,  current
inflation--reflecting  the  expectation  of future  inflation--will  rise.  If,
at a later  time,  the  public  believes  that  nothing  short  of a  major  fiscal
package  reducing  the  deficit  is  possible,  the  expected  inflation  rate  may
be reduced  and  current  inflation--again  reflecting  the  expectation  of
future  inflation--may  falll 2.
Milton  Friedman's  famous  statement  that  inflation  is always  and
everywhere  a  monetary  phenomenon  is  correct. However  governments  do  not
print  money  at  a rapid  rate  out  of a clear  blue  sky.  They  generally  print
money  in order  to  cover  their  budget  deficits. Rapid  money  growth  is
conceivable  without  an underlying  fiscal  imbalance. But it is  unlikely.
Thus  rapid  inflation  is  almost  always  a fiscal  phenomenon.
12This  argument  is  developed  by Drazen  and  Helpman  (1986).21
V.  Concluding  Comments.
The  macroeconomic  analysis  that  we have  outlined  is a  useful
starting  point  for  examining  the  economics  of  budget  deficits. But it
takes  more than  a  single  indicator  to  judge  fiscal  policy. The
microeconomics  of fiscal  deficits  is  both  crucial  in its  own  right  and  has
an impact  on the  macroeconomics  of deficits. The  more  efficient  are  taxes
and  spending,  the  higher  is  the  public  deficit  that  can  be sustained,  since
growth  will  be higher.
Consideration  of the  macroeconomics  of the  government  budget
constraint  points  to the  dangers  that  arise  from  excessive  budget  deficits:
inflation,  exchange  crises,  external  debt  crises,  and  high real  interest
rates,  with implications  for  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  trade  account,
and for  investment.  None  of the  links  are  automatic,  for  there  are  choices
in the  sources  of financing,  and  lags  in  the  effects  of  money  printing  and
borrowing  on inflation  and  interest  rates.
Nor  are  moderate  budget  deficits  to  be avoided  at all  costs;  small
deficits  can  be financed  without  creating  excessive  inflation,  exchange
crises,  or building  up debt  excessively.  If the  real  interest  rate  exceeds
the  growth  rate  of GNP,  any  primary  deficit  smaller  i-han  the  maximum  amount
of seignorage  revenue  the  government  can  obtain  is  sustainable.  Whether
any  particular  path  of fiscal  policy  is  sustainable  has to  be checked
through  projections  of the  debt  to  GNP  ratio;  a given  deficit  is  more
likely  to  be sustainable  the  higher  the  growth  rate  of output.22
Of course,  the  fact  that  a fiscal  policy  is sustainable  does  not
mean that  it is  optimal. A fiscal  deficit  crowds  out  private  investment,
and  it  might  well  be desirable  to reduce  the  debt-to-GNP  ratio  in  order  to
crowd  in  private  investment.  Similarly  it is  not  optimal  to  collect  the
maximum  possible  amount  of revenue  from  seignorage,  but rather  a smaller
amount  corresponding  to  a lower  inflation  rate.
Both theory  and  evidence  tell  us--and  warn  us--that  large  budget
deficits  pose  very  real  threats  to  macroeconomic  stability,  and  therefore
to  economic  growth  and  development.23
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ApRendix  1:  Problems  of  Measurement.
International  comparisons  of fiscal  data  are  plagued  by the  great
variation  of methodology  and  the  lack  of  comprehensive  coverage  of the
public  sector. Deficit  definitions  change  from  country  to  country  or even
over  time  in the  same  country. One  country  may include  aid  receipts  as
revenue,  while  another  treats  it as  deficit  finance. Some  countries  have
data  only  on the  national  government,  while  others  cover  to  varying  degrees
local  governments,  state  enterprises,  and  decentralized  agencies. In  some
countries,  activities  of the  central  bank or  other  public  financial
intermediaries  create  significant  losses,  but including  their  deficits  in
the  overall  public  sector  is  difficult  because  of conceptual  problems  and
lack  of reliable  data.  Social  security  is consolidated  with the  public
accounts  in some  countries,  but  not in  others. Many examples  can  be given
of such  accounting  difficulties. 13
Even  aside  from  technical  accounting  problems,  there  are  broader
issues  of  how to define  defici!.z  in  an economically  meaningful  way.  Many
alternative  definitions  have  been  proposed  to  attempt  to remove  short-term
distortions  from  deficit  measuresl 4. The  most important  single  correction
is to  adjust  the  deficit  for  the  inflation  component  of interest  payments,
yielding  the  inflation-corrected  or  operational  deficit. The correction
removes  from  the  deficit  the  product  (inflation  rate  x stock  of debt),
thereby  including  in the  operational  deficit  only  the  real  component  of
U3The  most  comprehensive  collection  of fiscal  data is  in the  IMF's
Government  Financial  Statistics.  World  DeveloDment  ReRort  1988,  p45
describes  data  sources..
14A  discussion  of  alternative  measures  of the  deficit  is  presented  in  World
Development  Report  1988,  pp 56-57.26
interest. The  correction  can  be substantial.  For  instance,  estimates  of
the  fiscal  deficit  in  Mexico  for  1987  imply  a deficit  of over  15%  of GDP,
but the  operational  balance  shows  a surplus  of 3%.
Some  economists  disagree  with the  use  of the  operational  deficit  on
the  grounds  that  the  government  has in  fact  to  find  a way  of meeting  the
interest  payments,  even  if they  only  reflect  compensation  for  inflation.  A
useful  way  of thinking  of the  operational  deficit  is that  it  provides  an
approximate  measure  of the  size  of the  deficit  the  government  would  have to
deal  with if it succeeded  in  getting  rid  of inflation.  Thus the  fact  that
there  was  an operational  surplus  in  Mexico  in 1987  meant  that  there  was  no
underlying  fiscal  problem  that  was inconsistent  w_th  the  government
attaining  a zero  or low  inflation  equilibrium.
In  addition  to  correcting  the  deficit  for  inflation,  influences
from  commodity  price  fluctuations  or domestic  output  above  or below  trend
are  sometimes  removed  to  give  the  structural  deficit.
Deficits  can  also  be underestimated  because  of controls  on interest
rates  or  key  prices. For  example,  negative  real  interest  rates  paid  on
government  debt  will  make the  deficit  appear  lower  than  if the  interest
bill  were  evaluated  at the  true  opportunity  cost  of capital. An
artificially  low  exchange  rate  applied  to  government  external  debt  in  a
system  of multiple  exchange  rates  would  similarly  suppress  the  size  of the
true  deficit. To correct  for  such  distortions,  public  deficits  can  be
evaluated  at the  long-run  equilibrium  values  of the  interest  rate,  exchange
rate,  and  other  key  relative  prices.27
Apnendix  2: Bibliographical  Note.
Several  literature  references  have  been  provided  in  the  text.  I
present  here  a small  sampling  of some  additional  sources  relevant  to the
themes  discussed  in  the  lecture. A good  summary  of the  macroeconomics  of
the  financing  of government  deficits  is  provided  in  Buiter  (1988)  and  Van
Wijnbergen  (1989),  with earlier  treatments  by Tanzi (1984,  1985)  also  very
useful. Empirical  analysis  of  deficit  financing  is  provided  in Easterly
(1989).
Treatment  of the  problem  of  high inflation  is  contained  in  Blejer
and  Liviatan  (1987)  and  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1988). Ize  and  Ortiz (1987)
discuss  the  relationship  between  fiscal  deficits  and  capital  flight. A
discussion  of the  link  between  the  external  debt  crisis  and  fiscal  behavior
is  contained  in  many of the  papers  in  Sachs  (1989).
The  relationship  between  debt  and  growth  is  discussed  in
many  of the  papers  in Corbo  et al (1987). Van  Wijnbergen  (1988)  and  Buiter
(1985)  contain  clear  presentations  of the  debt  dynamics  identity.
The  role  of  public  investment  in  commodity-exporting  countries  is
trenchantly  analyzed  in  Gelb (1988). The  Tanzi  effect  is  presented  in
Tanzi  (1977). A good  treatment  of the  role  of expectations  in
macroeconomic  policy  can  be found  in  Drazen  and  Helpman  (1986).PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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